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ABSTRACT
Biomedical research, nomatter howwell designed and ethically conducted,
carries uncertainties and exposes participants to risk of injury. Research in-
juries can range from the relatively minor to those that result in hospital-
ization, permanent disability, or even death. Participants might also suffer
a range of economic harms related to their injuries. Unlike the vast major-
ity of developed countries, which have implemented no-fault compensation
systems, the United States continues to rely on the tort system to compen-
sate injured research participants—an approach that is no longer morally
defensible. Despite decades of US advisory panels advocating for no-fault
compensation, little progress has been made. Accordingly, this article pro-
poses a novel and necessary no-fault compensation system, grounded in the
ethical notion of compensatory justice. This first-of-its-kind concrete pro-
posal aims to treat like cases alike, offer fair compensation, and disburse
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2  Just compensation: a no-fault proposal for research-related injuries
compensation withmaximum efficiency andminimum administrative cost.
It also harmonizes national and international approaches—an increasingly
important goal as research becomes more globalized, multi-site trials grow
in number, and institutions and sponsors in the United States move to
single-IRB review.
KEYWORDS: clinical trial, compensation, compensatory justice, no-fault
compensation, research injury, remedy
Biomedical research involving human participants serves an essential and irreplaceable
function in our society. It is responsible for some of themost significantmedical break-
throughs of the last century,1 and the knowledge it yields ensures the safety and efficacy
ofnewdrugs anddevices.Reaping these societal rewards, however, is not a risk-free ven-
ture. Because sound science requires experiments grounded in uncertainty, research in-
herently exposes participants to a variety of potential, and often unanticipated, harms
for the benefit of others. Althoughmost harms from experimental interventions are rel-
atively minor, research participants can sustain injuries that result in hospitalization,
permanent disability, or even death.2 Research participants may also suffer economic
harms related to their injuries, including lost wages, work-related disability, and costs
for long-termmedical care.3
Despite extensive federal regulations aimed at protecting participants in research—
including requirements for informed consent, risk minimization, equitable subject se-
lection, adequate data monitoring, and institutional review board (IRB) review of pro-
posed research4—there is no legal requirement to care for or financially compensate
participants who suffer research-related injuries.5 Unlike the vast majority of devel-
oped countries, which have implemented no-fault compensation systems to ensure the
1 The development of antibiotics, medications for cardiovascular disease, and improved treatment for some
cancers have led to a steady decline in the US mortality since 1935. Donna L. Hoyert, Nat’l Center for
Health Statistics, NCHS Data Brief No. 88, 75 Years of Mortality in the United States, 1935–2010, at 2 (2012),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db88.pdf (last accessed July 28, 2015). Biomedical research has
also produced vaccines that have either eradicated or significantly mitigated diseases including smallpox, yel-
low fever, polio, diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis. See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Epidemi-
ology and Prevention of Vaccine-Preventable Diseases, Appendix E. Hamborsky J, Kroger A, Wolfe S, eds.
13th ed. Washington D.C. Public Health Foundation, 2015.
2 See eg Ganesh Suntharalingam et al.,Cytokine Storm in a Phase 1 Trial of the Anti-CD28Monoclonal Antibody
TGN1412, 355NEWENG. J.MED. 1018 (2006) (reviewing a phase 1 clinical trial that resulted in organ failure
and intensivemedical care for the six healthy volunteers who received the novel drug); Susan Levine,Clinical
Trial Was Near-Death Experience Worth His While, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2001, at S5 (describing how five of
the ten participants in a National Institutes of Health (NIH) study of an experimental hepatitis B drug died
of unforeseen toxicity in 1993, and comparing that trial to a Johns Hopkins asthma study in which a healthy
volunteer died in 2001); National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC), ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN
RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS, VOL. 1: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL
BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION 2–4 (2001) [hereinafter ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES] (discussing sev-
eral trials in which research participants were critically injured, including the 1999 gene transfer study at the
University of Pennsylvania, which resulted in the death of Jesse Gelsinger).
3 Institute of Medicine, Responsible Research: A Systems Approach to Protecting Research Participants 193–194
(2002) [hereinafter Responsible Research].
4 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (2013).
5 Under the status quo, injured research participants may receive acute medical care for their injuries, but very
few institutions provide that care at no cost to the participant. See infra notes 20, 21.
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Just compensation: a no-fault proposal for research-related injuries  3
provision of medical care and compensation for injured research participants,6 the
United States continues to rely on the tort system as the primary route to remedia-
tion.7 Unfortunately, for most injured research participants, the tort system is a litiga-
tion lottery: a few plaintiffs receive large settlements, but most recover little or nothing
from the legal process.8 To compound this problem, a variety of federal laws preclude
some classes of research participants, including international participants and the US
participants in federally conducted research, from successfully bringing suit for their
research-related injuries.9 The absence of a federal policy to address research-related
injuriesmeans thatmany injured research participants are abandoned at theirmost vul-
nerable moment by the very regulations designed to protect them.10
This issue has not gone unnoticed; over the past 40 years, a number of proposals
have been put forth to address the problem of compensation for research-related in-
juries.11 Of these, the three systems that have garnered the most attention from fed-
eral advisory committees considering the issue are as follows: the creation of a specialty
court (like the Vaccine Court operated under the National Vaccine Injury Compensa-
tionProgram), the establishment of a nationwide compensation fund (like the Septem-
ber 11thVictimCompensationFundorBPDeepwaterHorizonCompensationFund),
and the enactment of a legal requirement compelling research institutions and/or re-
search sponsors to purchase insurance or self-insure against research participants’ in-
juries (somewhat like workers’ compensation).12 These proposals—as previously ar-
ticulated by their proponents—have been criticized for a variety of reasons, including
that they do not provide a cohesive ethical justification for compensation, do not pro-
vide a framework for evaluating claims, and require too much bureaucracy.13
This article is the first to propose a concrete and detailed no-fault compensation
system, grounded in the ethical notion of compensatory justice, to address research-
related injuries. Taking its cue from the 1982 President’s Commission for the Study
of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical Behavioral Research—which con-
cluded that a successful compensation systemwould treat like cases alike,make fair pay-
ment for the harm sought to be remedied, and disburse funds withmaximum efficiency
6 PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, MORAL SCIENCE: PROTECTING
PARTICIPANTS IN HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH 57, 186–90 (2011) [hereinafter MORAL SCIENCE].
7 Elizabeth R. Pike, Recovering from Research: A No-Fault Proposal to Compensate Injured Research Participants,
38 AM. J. L. &MED. 7, 23, 29 (2012).
8 See Responsible Research, supra note 3, at 190, 191; see also Jeffrey O’Connell, Tort Versus No-Fault: Com-
pensation and Injury Prevention, 1 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 63, 63 (1987) (invoking the phrase
‘litigation lottery’ to describe the tort outcomes that displace fair and rational methods of compensation).
9 See Pike, supra note 7, at 29, 38; Elizabeth R. Pike, In Need of Remedy: US Policy for Compensating Injured
Research Participants, 40 J. MED. ETHICS 182 (2014).
10 See Leslie M. Henry,Moral Gridlock: Conceptual Barriers to No-Fault Compensation for Injured Research Sub-
jects, 41 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 411, 411 (2013).
11 Id. at 413, 421. See alsoHazel Beh,Compensation for Research Injuries, IRB:ETHICS&HUMANRES.,May–June
2005, at 11, 13 (discussing a variety of compensation schemes including a specialty court and a nationwide
compensation fund).
12 MORAL SCIENCE, supra note 6, at 56, 69; Ethical and Policy Issues, supra note 2, at 123, 126.
13 SeeHenry, supra note 10 (describing the absence of a cohesive justification for no-fault compensation); Pike,
supra note 7 (critiquing the specialty court and compensation fund approaches to compensation for research-
related injuries).
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4  Just compensation: a no-fault proposal for research-related injuries
and minimum administrative cost14—this article argues that a no-fault compensation
system should take the form of a self-governed insurance/self-insurance program,
rather than a specialty court or nationwide compensation fund. The proposal requires
research sponsors and institutions to self-insure or purchase insurance to cover the
costs of acutemedical care and compensation for injured research participants.15 In ad-
dition to satisfying the criteria for an ethical compensation system set forth by the 1982
Commission, this proposal also has the benefit of harmonizing national and interna-
tional approaches to compensation, an increasingly important goal as researchbecomes
ever more globalized, as multisite trials increase in number, as the United States moves
to single-IRB review, and as the most recent iteration of the Declaration of Helsinki
makes compensation for research-related injury an essential component of ethical
research.16
Before detailing the proposed compensation plan, this article sets forth three critical
aspects of the groundwork on which it is built. First, the article starts by briefly describ-
ing the current ad hoc approach to addressing research-related injuries and explains
why continuing that practice is not only practically infeasible, but also morally defi-
cient. It then offers possible explanations for why stakeholders—including the United
States government, institutions, and industry sponsors—have thus far failed to imple-
ment a no-fault compensation system despite four decades of federal advisory pan-
els calling for such a solution. Second, the article advances a theory of compensatory
justice to support the position that compensation is owed to participants who suffer
research-related injuries.This theory ultimately shapes determinations about when re-
search participants are eligible for compensation and what kinds of compensation are
available. Third, the article provides a brief explanation of why the proposed no-fault
insurance/self-insurance plan that follows is ethically, legally, and practically preferable
to a specialty court or nationwide compensation fund.
INADEQUACIES OF THE STATUS QUO
UnevenCoverage for Research-Related Injuries
Under the current federal regulations, researchers, institutions, and sponsors are not
required to provide free medical care or compensation to injured research partici-
pants. The human subjects research regulations simply require that, for research in-
volving greater than minimal risk, the informed consent document must include ‘an
explanation as to whether any compensation and . . . any medical treatments are avail-
able if injury occurs, and if so, what they consist of, or where further information
can be obtained’.17 In addition, the rules stipulate that the informed consent process
14 U.S. PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, COMPENSATING FOR RESEARCH INJURIES: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF
PROGRAMS TO REDRESS INJURED SUBJECTS, VOL. 1, at 127 (1982) [hereinafter COMPENSATING FOR RESEARCH
INJURIES].
15 In this article, the term compensation is used todescribe themonetary remedy that injured researchparticipants
(or their families, in the case of death) may receive. A comprehensive no-fault system should provide acute
medical care at no cost to the injured participant, but when that is not feasible (eg the research site is not
equipped to provide emergency care), compensation should include reimbursement for the costs of acute
medical care. Compensation may also cover lost wages, disability, long-term care costs, and death benefits.
16 WORLD MEDICAL ASS’N, Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human
Subjects § 15 (as amended 2013).
17 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(6) (2013); 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(6) (2014).
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Just compensation: a no-fault proposal for research-related injuries  5
cannot include any exculpatory language that would force a research participant to
waive any legal right or release any investigator, sponsor, or institution from liability for
negligence.18
In the absenceof a legal requirement to provide care or compensation to injuredpar-
ticipants, most academic institutions and government agencies have not implemented
a compensation system.19 A recent study found that more than half of the US research
institutions surveyed donot offer freemedical care or other compensation for research-
related injuries, and that less than 5 per cent offer ‘unconditional compensation’, de-
fined in that study as a statement by the research institution that it will pay for harm-
ful effects or injuries resulting from the experimental intervention.20 These findings are
consistent with earlier surveys, which found that the majority of research institutions
charge injured research participants the usual and customary fees for medical care and
do not provide compensation for lost wages, disability, or long-term care.21
Although most academic institutions and government agencies do not cover the
medical costs associated with research-related injuries, there are a few exceptions. Of
these, the best-known academic institution is the University of Washington (UW),
which has a self-funded, no-fault plan that provides up to $250,000 in medical treat-
ment at a UW facility and up to $10,000 in out-of-pocket expenses to healthy partic-
ipants who experience research-related injuries.22 A handful of other academic insti-
tutions have implemented more modest self-insurance programs to provide limited
18 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2013); 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (2014). Tomeet the conditions set forth by these two require-
ments, the Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP) recommends that where no care or compen-
sation will be provided to injured research participants, the informed consent document should say the fol-
lowing: ‘The hospital makes no commitment to provide free medical care or payment for any unfavorable
outcomes resulting from participation in this research. Medical services will be offered at the usual charge’.
‘Exculpatory Language’ in Informed Consent, OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS, Nov. 15, 1996,
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/policy/exculp.html (last accessed July 28, 2015). The OHRP released proposed
revisions to this guidance document in 2011, seeDraftGuidance on Exculpatory Language in InformedConsent,
OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS AND THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, Aug. 19, 2011,
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/newsroom/rfc/exculpatorydraft2011.html# ftn4 (last accessed July 28, 2015),
but a new policy has not been adopted.
19 David B. Resnik, Compensation for Research-Related Injuries: Ethical and Legal Issues, 27 J. LEGAL MED. 263,
273–79 (2006) (quoting the language that addresses compensation for research-related injuries from several
institution’s informed consent documents).
20 David B. Resnik et al., Research-Related Injury Compensation Policies of U.S. Research Institutions, 36 IRB:
ETHICS &HUMAN RES. 12 (2014).
21 See LEWIN GROUP, FINAL REPORT: TASK ORDER NO. 2: CARE/COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES IN CLINICAL
RESEARCH (2005) (reviewing policies from 129 institutions and finding that none offered compensation for
lost wages, disability, or pain and suffering, and only 11 offered to provide free care or treatment for research-
related injuries, while the majority charged injured research participants the usual and customary fees for
medical care); Michael K. Paasche-Orlow & Frederick L. Brancati, Assessment of Medical School Institutional
Review Board Policies Regarding Compensation of Subjects for Research-Related Injury, 118 AM. J. MED. 175
(2005) (surveying 113 medical schools and finding that roughly one-fifth offered coverage for medical bills
associated with research-related injuries, and of those, only half covered fees for emergency care).
22 See eg Human Subjects Division, Human Subjects Assistance Program, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON,
March 27, 2015, http://www.washington.edu/research/hsd/docs/1800 (last accessed July 28, 2015); Hu-
man Subjects Division, HSAP Information Sheet, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, updated Feb. 17, 2015,
http://www.washington.edu/research/hsd/docs/1801 (last accessed July 28, 2015). A previous iteration
of this program applied to both healthy participants and participants in so-called therapeutic research. See
Karen E. Moe, Director and Assistant Vice Provost for Research, University of Washington Human Sub-
jects Division, presentation to Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, Nov. 17, 2011,
http://bioethics.gov/node/391 (last accessed July 28, 2015).
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6  Just compensation: a no-fault proposal for research-related injuries
medical coverage for injured research participants.23 The Department of Veterans Af-
fairs, the Department of Defense, and theNational Institutes of Health (NIH)Clinical
Center, among others, also have policies that offer medical care to participants who
suffer research-related injuries in agency-conducted clinical trials,24 andMedicare cov-
ers the costs of care for some trial-related injuries.25 Unfortunately, because these aca-
demic, government, and private programs cover only limited research populations,
most participants in research remain unprotected when they sustain research-related
injuries.
Trade representatives for pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies have as-
serted that many of them ‘carry insurance to cover the costs of research-related in-
juries’.26 Because industry sponsors are not legally required to carry insurance, there
are no guidelines for howmuch coverage they should have, which injuries are covered,
what kinds of compensation they should offer, or even how and when research partici-
pants should be informed that compensation is available in case of injury. Importantly,
there are no available data to demonstrate that sponsors reliably pay claims initiated by
injured research participants. To the contrary, some critics suggest that industry insur-
ance policies are so vaguely written that insurers typically avoid payment under their
terms altogether.27
TheLitigation Lottery
Because most institutions and sponsors do not provide free medical care for
research-related injuries, and almost none provide monetary compensation, injured
23 See eg OFFICE OF THE HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTION PROGRAM, UCLA, GUIDANCE AND PRO-
CEDURE: TREATMENT AND COMPENSATION FOR RESEARCH RELATED INJURY, last updated Apr.
8, 2013, http://ora.research.ucla.edu/OHRPP/Documents/Policy/10/Treatment Compensation.pdf (last
accessed July 28, 2015) (not applying to research ‘designed to benefit the subject directly’).
24 Since 1998, theDepartment of Veterans Affairs (VA) has providedmedical treatment for injuries that partici-
pants suffer in research approved by aVA IRB and conducted under VA supervision. See 38C.F.R. § 17.85(a)
(2013). In 1999, the Department of Defense (DoD) enacted a similar policy, which mandates that all DoD
research involving more than minimal risk include an arrangement to cover the treatment of any research-
related injuries. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DOD INSTRUCTION NUMBER 6000.08: FUNDING AND ADMINIS-
TRATIONOFCLINICAL INVESTIGATIONPROGRAMS 8 (updated Jan. 22, 2014).TheNIHClinical Center likewise
provides free short-term medical care for injuries resulting from the participant’s participation in research at
the Clinical Center. See OFFICE OF HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH, NAT’L INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, SHEET 6:
GUIDELINES FORWRITING INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENTS (Nov. 20, 2006).
25 Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, National Coverage Determination (NCD) for Routine Costs in
Clinical Trials § 310.1 (July 9, 2007) (‘Medicare covers the routine costs of qualifying clinical trials . . . as
well as reasonable and necessary items and services used to diagnose and treat complications arising from
participation in all clinical trials.’). This approach is consistent with Medicare’s interest in encouraging
clinical trial participation as a way to make medical care more data driven. Notably, the phrase ‘quali-
fying clinical trials’ does not include trials involving healthy volunteers. Larry D. Scott, Research-Related
Injury: Problem and Solutions, 31 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 419, 421 (2003). As of January 2014, private
insurers are also required to pay for routine care costs for participants in some types of clinical trials, but
not all private insurers cover research-related injuries. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–8 (2012). See also American
Cancer Society, Clinical Trials: What You Need to Know, rev. Oct. 31, 2014, http://www.cancer.org/
treatment/treatmentsandsideeffects/clinicaltrials/whatyouneedtoknowaboutclinicaltrials/clinical-trials-
what-you-need-to-know-private-insurers-a-c-a (last accessed July 27, 2014). States may also have their
own laws regulating insurance coverage for clinical trial participants. See American Society of Clinical
Oncology, Insurance Coverage for Clinical Trial Participants: State Laws and Cooperative Agreements,
http://www.asco.org/insurance-coverage-clinical-trial-participants (last accessed July 27, 2015).
26 MORAL SCIENCE, supra note 6, at 66.
27 See Carl Elliott, Justice for Injured Research Subjects, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 6, 7 (2012).
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Just compensation: a no-fault proposal for research-related injuries  7
participants have few avenues for addressing their research-related health and financial
injuries other than through the tort system.The tort system, however, presents several
challenges for injured research participants, who can rarely meet the financial and ev-
identiary burdens of a successful legal claim. Although there are a few reported cases
in which plaintiffs with research-related injuries prevail, these outcomes are generally
limited to facts in which there was deficient informed consent, investigator conflict of
interest, or fraud.28 For the vast majority of injured research participants, the tort sys-
tem is a costly, lengthy, and adversarial process that yields no remedy.29
Most research-related injury cases allege negligence, an action that requires plain-
tiffs to prove not only that the research team breached a duty to them, but also that
the research intervention caused their injury, and that the research teamwas at fault. At
each juncture in this process, the injured participant faces obstacles to recovery.30 First,
there is a growing consensus that as long as researchers comply with the federal regu-
lations and satisfy IRB requirements prior to conducting research, they have satisfied
their duty of care.31 Second, proving causation is problematic for research participants,
many ofwhomsuffer fromunderlyingmedical conditions thatmake it difficult to deter-
mine whether their alleged injury is the result of the experimental intervention or their
disease.32 The last, and arguably most challenging, element of a tort claim for injured
research participants is proving that the investigator, research institution, and/or spon-
sor are at fault.33 Well-conducted research can and does sometimes result in injuries
in the absence of negligence or wrongdoing, which is precisely why experimental trials
are so important. But in the absence of fault, research participants are generally unable
to successfully sue in tort.34 Moreover, certain classes of injured research participants,
28 See eg Gelsinger v. Univ. of Pennsylvania, No. 001885 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. filed Sept. 18, 2000) (alleging fail-
ure to adequately disclose risks during informed consent, financial conflict of interest, and fraud); Diaz v.
Hillsborough County Hospital Authority, 165 F.R.D. 689 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (involving low-income women
who claimed that, while pregnant and in labor, they were given a drug without being informed that it was
experimental or that they could refuse to participate). TheDiaz case settled before trial for $3.8 million, and
the Gelsinger case resulted in a multimillion dollar settlement. See Alice Dembner, Lawsuits Target Medical
Research, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 12, 2002, at A1.
29 MichelleM.Mello et al.,TheRise of Litigation in Human Subjects Research, 139 ANNALS INTERNALMED. 40, 42
(2003).
30 See Pike, supra note 7, for a more detailed discussion of the substantive legal barriers injured research partic-
ipants face in tort cases.
31 Id. See also Roger L. Jansson, Researcher Liability for Negligence in Human Subject Research: Informed Consent
and Researcher Malpractice Actions, 78 WASH. L. REV. 229, 247 (2003) (suggesting that most courts now use
the federal regulations as the standard of care for informed consent in human subject research).
32 Resnik, supra note 19, at 266; Scott, supra note 25, at 423.
33 John A. Robertson, Compensating Injured Research Subjects: II. The Law, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, Dec.
1976, at 29, 30.
34 This outcome is further amplified in jurisdictions that limit or preclude recovery under the assumption of risk
and contributory negligence doctrines. Because federal regulations require researchers to obtain informed
consent, all participants sign a document indicating that they understand the risks posed by the clinical trial
inwhich they enroll. In jurisdictionswith assumption of risk doctrines, courts have limited recovery to injuries
that are not mentioned in the informed consent document, reasoning that research participants assume the
risks for all other injurieswhen they consent toparticipate.Thedoctrineof contributorynegligence can further
reduce the likelihood of recovery, particularly if there is evidence that the participant played a role in his or her
injury. See E.HaaviMorreim,Consumer-DefinedHealth Plans: Emerging Challenges fromTort andContract, 39
J. HEALTH L. 307, 311 (2006); Carl H. Coleman,Duties to Subjects in Clinical Research, 58 VAND. L. REV. 387,
410–11 (2005).
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8  Just compensation: a no-fault proposal for research-related injuries
including the US participants in federally conducted research and international partic-
ipants in both privately and federally funded research, face additional legal barriers to
recovery. 35
Gridlock
For 40 years, federal advisory panels have concluded that the absence of an adequate
remedy for research-related injuries is inconsistent with the otherwise protectionist
rules governing researchwith human participants.36These advisory panels have repeat-
edly recommended that theUnitedStates implement ano-fault compensationprogram
and have noted that continued reliance on the tort system may be unjust. And yet, the
primarymechanism for compensation remains the tort system.The absence of system-
atic no-fault compensation may result, in part, from a lack of political will, a mistaken
belief that the current legal system offers sufficient recourse, and a desire to have more
data about the nature of research injuries and the costs of addressing them.37 The fact
that research participants lack the solidarity, identity, and advocacy focus that enables
other groups to function as collective bargaining units and demand better protections
may also explain why change has not been forthcoming.38 Finally, although numerous
federal advisory committees have recommended no-fault compensation, their failure
to coalesce around a moral justification for that duty has created ‘moral gridlock’ and
impeded efforts toward systematic change.39 Given the widespread national and inter-
national consensus that no-fault compensation is owed to injured research participants,
the time is ripe for implementation of an ethically sound, administratively efficient, and
financially feasible no-fault compensation plan.
ETHICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR COMPENSATION
Theno-fault system proposed in this article is grounded in the ethical principle of com-
pensatory justice, which is the justification for no-fault compensation that has histori-
cally garnered the most support from federal advisory panels considering this issue.40
Compensatory justice operates from the premise that there is an obligation to redress
injuries suffered by individuals who undertake risks in an activity that is for the benefit
35 See Pike, supra note 7, at 29, 38.
36 MORAL SCIENCE, supra note 6, at 61, 62; Institute ofMedicine,Responsible Research, supra note 3, at 191, 192;
Ethical and Policy Issues, supra note 2, at 124; Presidential Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Exper-
iments (ACHRE), Final Report Recommendation 14 (1995) [hereinafter Final Report]; COMPENSATING FOR
RESEARCH INJURIES, supra note 15, at 4; U.S. DEP’T OFHEALTH, EDUCATION, ANDWELFARE, SECRETARY’S TASK
FORCE ON THECOMPENSATION OF INJURED RESEARCH SUBJECTS: REPORT (1977) [hereinafter COMPENSATION
OF INJURED RESEARCH SUBJECTS].
37 See Henry, supra note 10, at 412, 421; Pike, In Need of Remedy, supra note 9, at 183. Some have argued that
there are not enough research-related injuries to warrant implementing no-fault compensation. There are
three responses. First, the data on compensation for research-related injuries are extremely limited, making it
difficult to make far-reaching determinations on the scope of the problem. Second, as an ethical matter, even
if the number of injured research participants is small, it is nevertheless unjust to require them to bear the
physical and financial costs of their injury. And third, as a practical matter, if the number of injuries is small,
the cost of implementing no-fault compensation should be quite low.
38 See Elliott, supra note 27, at 7; Henry, supra note 10, at 421.
39 Henry, supra note 10, at 412 (explaining that the various federal ‘committees’ articulation of numerous and
sometimes disparate reasons for compensating injured research subjects actually results in incongruent obli-
gations that favor different kinds of compensation systems’).
40 Id. at 417.
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Just compensation: a no-fault proposal for research-related injuries  9
of others.41 The principle is one of fairness: when people are engaged in a collective en-
terprise, those who accept the benefits of that enterprise must compensate those who
incur injuries on their behalf.42 Veterans’ benefits, for example, are provided to individ-
uals who undertake risks to preserve national security. Ensuring that compensation is
available for research-related injuries serves a similar end. It acknowledges and reme-
dies the injuries that individual research participants may suffer in the broader quest to
advance and improve the public’s health.
Although federal advisory panels have generally agreed that compensatory jus-
tice ought to underpin a no-fault compensation system for research-related injuries,
they have deliberated about other important questions, including whether all research
participants—or only healthy volunteers in non-therapeutic research—qualify for
compensation; whether the research enterprise or society is the beneficiary of research
and thus the party obligated to compensate injured participants; and whether to offer
acute medical care only, or also financial compensation for injuries.43 These issues are
addressed in turn.
First, the no-fault plan proposed in this article does not distinguish between types
of research participants for eligibility purposes. Regardless of whether an injury is sus-
tained in so-called therapeutic or non-therapeutic research, compensatory justice re-
quires that compensation be available.44 Although some federal committees have con-
cluded that injured research participants in ‘therapeutic research’ have a ‘weaker moral
claim’ for compensation than their counterparts in non-therapeutic research because
the former participate ‘with the hope of deriving personal health benefits’,45 that analy-
sis is unpersuasive for two reasons.Not only domany patient participants expose them-
selves to greater risks in research than they would undertake in ordinary medical care,
there is also no guarantee that their research participation will yield personal benefit.
Moreover, compensatory justice does not focus on the individual’s motivation in par-
ticipating in a given activity; rather it emphasizes whether the activity is intended to
benefit others. Just as a soldier’s motivation for enlisting in the military has no effect
on his or her qualification for veterans benefits, so too, the research participant’s mo-
tivation for enrolling in a clinical trial should have no effect on his or her eligibility for
compensation. In both cases, the relevant criterion is that an individual has undertaken
risks by participating in an activity primarily intended for the benefit of others.
Second, the proposed no-fault plan places the compensatory obligation squarely
on the research enterprise—research institutions and industry sponsors—rather than
on society at large. Although the benefits of research ultimately redound to society,46
the research enterprise is the better locus of primary responsibility for research-related
41 JamesF.Childress,Compensating InjuredResearch Subjects: I.TheMoralArgument,HASTINGSCENTERREPORT,
Dec. 1976, at 21.
42 This notion is sometimes characterized as distributive justice. See Resnik, supra note 19, at 266.
43 Henry, supra note 10, at 417, 420.
44 See Pike, supra note 7, at 55. See also Steven Joffe & Franklin G. Miller, Bench to Bedside: Mapping the Moral
Terrain of Clinical Research, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, Mar./Apr. 2008, at 30, 37–38 (suggesting that com-
pensation is owed for injuries that occur in both therapeutic and non-therapeutic research).
45 COMPENSATING FORRESEARCH INJURIES, supra note 14, at 133. See alsoCOMPENSATIONOF INJUREDRESEARCH
SUBJECTS, supra note 36, at VI 8, 9 (discussing the ‘serious reservations’ someTask Forcemembers had about
compensating participants in therapeutic research).
46 MORAL SCIENCE, supra note 6, at 56.
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10  Just compensation: a no-fault proposal for research-related injuries
injuries for several reasons: it is the first party to ‘profit or derive other benefits’ from
research,47 its proximate relationship with research participants means it is best posi-
tioned to efficiently redress injuries, and it can internalize the costs of compensation or
shift those costs to society downstream.48 Moreover, by imposing responsibility on the
research enterprise, the proposed plan reinforces thewell-accepted ethical standards of
professional beneficence and nonmaleficence.49 Consistent with those duties, the sys-
temmay appropriately reduce or eliminate some high-risk research, as institutions and
sponsors weigh the costs of covering potential research-related injuries in higher risk
trials against prospective benefits from those trials.
Third, because compensatory justice involves attempting to restore individuals to
the state of affairs they enjoyed before their injury, the proposed no-fault system in-
cludes the provision of free, immediatemedical care for research-related injuries aswell
as financial compensation for lost wages, disability, long-termmedical care, and where
indicated, death benefits.50 In recommending monetary compensation in addition to
acutemedical care, the proposal acknowledges and responds to the ‘actual loss ofwages
and out-of-pocket costs directly resulting from research-induced injuries’.51 In keeping
with the requirements of compensatory justice, this approach aims to leave participants
‘no worse off than they would have been had they not participated in research’.52
Finally, it is important to note that the proposed no-fault compensation plan does
not preclude participants who suffer research-related injuries from instead pressing
their claim through the traditional tort system.53 The tort system, which operates un-
der the principle of reparative justice, is designed to ‘repair’ an injury to one party
that is wrongfully caused by another. In cases where research-related injuries are the
consequence of unethical research or wrongdoing by the research enterprise, the
tort system’s focus on fault may offer a more morally appropriate and financially
47 Ethical and Policy Issues, supra note 2, at 126.
48 GuidoCalabresi, SomeThoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALEL.J. 499 (1961) (explaining
that manufacturers can spread the risks of making a product across consumers through higher pricing, which
represents the product’s true cost).
49 MORAL SCIENCE, supra note 6, at 61 (noting that researchers ‘ought not to engage in such research unless
they can be assured that there is a system in place to care for those harmed by research so that their duties of
beneficence and nonmaleficence can be fulfilled’).
50 Although compensatory justice aims to make people whole, no-fault compensation systems may fall short of
this ideal as compared to the tort systemwith regard to some remedies (eg compensation for pain and suffer-
ing).Nevertheless, the vastmajority of injured participantswill fare better under the no-fault system than they
dounder the status quo. See supra section Inadequacies of the StatusQuo.Moreover, receipt of immediate com-
pensation without the need to sue in tort is itself a benefit that can justify some reduction in the total amount
paid. Interview with Kenneth Feinberg, former Special Master of the Federal September 11th Victim Com-
pensation Fund of 2001, and current Administrator of the General Motors Ignition Switch Compensation
Program (July 2, 2014). See also Tatsuo Kuroyanagi, Compensation and Insurance for Participants/Subjects
Harmed in Clinical Research Studies: Process of the Inheritance of Good Clinical Practice (GCP) in Japan and Its
Present Status, 56 JAPAN MED. ASS’N J. 458, 461 (2013) (stating that compensation provided under Japan’s
no-fault compensation system is set at seventy percent of what would be recoverable in tort because ‘in lieu
of full payment the subject (worker) will receive payment of compensation quickly, even if the employer was
not negligent’).
51 COMPENSATING FOR RESEARCH INJURIES, supra note 14, at 143.
52 Ethical and Policy Issues, supra note 2, at 123.
53 Consistent with the federal rules, research participants under the proposed compensation system will not
be asked during the informed consent process to waive any legal right or release any sponsor, institution, or
researcher from liability for negligence. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(6) (2013); 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(6) (2014).
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Just compensation: a no-fault proposal for research-related injuries  11
remunerative approach to making an injured party whole again than the no-fault com-
pensation plan offered here. The allowance of punitive damages in tort, for example,
provides monetary compensation to the injured party, punishment for the bad act, and
deterrence to future wrongful behavior. As this article noted at the outset, however,
the vast majority of research-related injuries are not the result of wrongdoing, and are
therefore the impetus behind—and the ideal candidates for—the no-fault compensa-
tion system proposed below.
WHAT FORM SHOULD A NO-FAULT COMPENSATION SYSTEM TAKE?
As the President’s Commission noted in 1982, a just compensation system should treat
like cases alike, make fair payment for the harm sought to be remedied, and disburse
payments with maximum efficiency and minimum administrative cost.54 It should in-
centivize research sponsors to manage and mitigate risks to participants—part of the
package of research protections aimed at making the research enterprise safer. A just
compensation system should be able tomake nuanced determinations of causation. As
a matter of administrative cost, it also should minimize new bureaucracy. Finally, a US
no-fault compensation system should aim to meet or exceed the ethical standards for
compensation set forth by international declarations and held by the United States’ in-
ternational research partners.55
Federal advisory panels have primarily focused on three types of no-fault compensa-
tion systems that could meet the criteria laid out above. One type of no-fault compen-
sation scheme that has been proposed to address research-related injures is a specialty
court modeled on the Vaccine Court, which was established by the National Vaccine
Injury Compensation Program (NVICP).56 Congress intended the program to pro-
vide a ‘swift, flexible, and less adversarial alternative’ to tort lawsuits.57 TheNVICP per-
mits individuals injured by vaccines to petition the federal government for compensa-
tion. Claimants present theirmedical records to theVaccineCourt to demonstrate that
shortly after they were vaccinated, they developed one of several adverse events listed
in the Vaccine Injury Table.58 Compensation is provided by the Vaccine Injury Com-
pensationTrust Fund,which is funded through a 75 cent surtax on the purchase of each
vaccine.59 Consequently, thosewho are vaccinated pay into theFund that compensates
those who are injured.
Since its inception, reviews of the Vaccine Court have been mixed, with some com-
mentators contending that it works reasonably well, and others criticizing it for becom-
ing too adversarial, having a severe backlog of cases, and only addressing a narrow range
54 COMPENSATING FOR RESEARCH INJURIES, supra note 14, at 127.
55 See Pike, supra note 7, at 47, 48.
56 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, Pub. L. No. 99–660 (1986).
57 Vaccine Program/Office of Special Masters, U.S. COURT OF FED. CLAIMS, http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/
vaccine-programoffice-special-masters (last accessed June 4, 2015).
58 42 C.F.R. § 100.3 (providing the Vaccine Injury Table). See also The Office of Special Masters, U.S. Court
of Fed. Claims, Guidelines for Practice UnderTheNational Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (2004),
http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/OSM.Guidelines.pdf (last accessed July 27, 2015) (set-
ting forth the claim process).
59 HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., NAT’L VACCINE INJURY COMP. PROGRAM, http://www.hrsa.gov/
vaccinecompensation/index.html (last accessed July 27, 2015) (describing the excise tax).
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12  Just compensation: a no-fault proposal for research-related injuries
of all vaccine-related injuries.60 Setting aside those criticisms, a specialty court is never-
theless inapt in the context of research-related injuries.Althougha specialty courtmight
aim to treat like cases alike and disburse payments with maximum efficiency and mini-
mumadministrative cost, itmay not adequately incentivize safer research. For instance,
because the Vaccine Court is funded by a surtax on all vaccines and immunizes vaccine
manufacturers from liability, the existence of Court by itself provides vaccinemanufac-
turers little incentive tomitigate risk.Moreover, unlike vaccine-related injuries—which
arise from a defined set of vaccines and are generally predictable enough to be charted
in a compensation table—the injuries arising from research emanate from thousands of
clinical trials, are wide ranging, frequently unforeseeable, and involvemore challenging
and nuanced determinations of causation.61 Additionally, the Vaccine Court was es-
tablished to address the urgent national concern that tort lawsuits would force vaccine
manufacturers out of the market altogether.62 The significant political will required to
create a new, stand-alone bureaucracy is unlikely to materialize in the context of com-
pensating injured research participants.63
A second model that has been suggested to address research-related injuries is
a no-fault compensation fund similar to the September 11th Victim Compensation
Fund or the BP Deepwater Horizon Disaster Victim Compensation Fund.64 With
funds like these, an amount of money is appropriated, either by the federal gov-
ernment or a private party, to be disbursed to a defined group of people injured
by a particular adverse event. Compensation funds of this kind satisfy some of the
relevant criteria: the system tends to treat injured individuals alike and distribute
compensation with maximum efficiency and minimum administrative burden.65 Nev-
ertheless, because these systems are retrospective—created after an injury-causing
event occurs—they do not incentivize the relevant actors to mitigate risk of harm to
others.
In addition, a national compensation fund would be both ill equipped to address
the more complicated issues of causation that arise in the context of research-related
injuries and would likely lack sufficient political will for implementation. For example,
in order to facilitate expedient claims processing, the administrators of the Septem-
ber 11th and BP Deepwater Horizon Funds were able to articulate categories of
claimants and compensable injuries based on knowledge of the triggering event rather
than engaging in a detailed case-by-case causal analysis. Defining categories of eligible
claimants would be challenging in the research context because a wide array of proto-
cols and procedures can result in injury. Moreover, like the Vaccine Court, a national
compensation fund for research-related injuries would likely require creation of a new
60 Elizabeth C. Scott,The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act Turns Fifteen, 56 FOOD DRUG L.J. 351 (2001);
LauraMazzuca, ShotThrough with Problems: A Partial Success, Vaccine Injury Fund Faces Case Logjam, Funding
Shortfalls, BUS. INS., Aug. 24, 1992.
61 See infra section Claims Evaluation—Compensable Injuries, Causation.
62 See Scott, supra note 25, at 422.
63 See supra section Inadequacies of the Status Quo—Gridlock.
64 Department of Justice, Final Report of the Special Master for the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund
of 2001, Vol. 1 (Nov. 17, 2004); Gulf Coast Claims Facility, http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/
(last accessed July 27, 2015) (succeeded by the Deepwater Horizon Claim Center,
http://www.deepwaterhorizoneconomicsettlement.com/) (last accessed July 27, 2015).
65 See Pike, supra note 7, at 52.
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Just compensation: a no-fault proposal for research-related injuries  13
bureaucracy, a substantial obstacle in the absence of a particular triggering event that
would shore up political will for injured research participants.
A final approach, and the one this article adopts, is that of a no-fault insurance/self-
insurance plan. This type of plan—discussed in more detail in the next section—
offers several advantages. Like a specialty court or national compensation fund,
an insurance/self-insurance system can treat like cases alike and distribute com-
pensation with maximum efficiency and minimum administrative burden.66 Unlike
a specialty court or compensation fund, however, this approach itself incentivizes re-
search sponsors to manage and mitigate risks by forcing institutions to internalize the
financial costs of research-related harms. In addition, an insurance/self-insurance plan
best enables decision makers to make nuanced case-by-case determinations of causa-
tion.67 Moreover, because individual institutions can implement this system voluntar-
ily, the approach does not require the creation of a new centralized bureaucracy, and
can therefore proceed in the absence of national political will. Finally, unlike a specialty
court or national compensation fund, a no-fault insurance/self-insurance requirement
best aligns with the approach taken by most foreign countries,68 thereby allowing the
United States to meet or exceed international legal norms related to compensation for
research-related injuries.69
Some question whether modification of the United States’ current approach to the
problem of compensation for research-related injuries is needed at all. The fact is that
the system is fundamentally broken. The United States continues to rely on a tort sys-
tem that limits the success of almost all research-related injury lawsuits and on research
participants’ personal insurance as the primary means of compensation for research-
related injuries. This approach falls far short of the goals of compensatory justice. The
primary critique of implementing a no-fault compensation system is that it would be
too costly to implement, an argument not borne out by empirical data.70 More im-
portantly, the costs of research-related injuries are not costs created by developing a
66 Whether no-fault insurance/self-insurance plans are equitable across institutions, meaning they treat simi-
larly injured research participants similarly, depends on how the system is implemented. If the system is set
forth with specificity in federal regulations, see infra sectionModifying the Federal Framework, it will treat like
cases alike. If, instead, individual institutions separately and voluntarily adopt this approach, then there may
be disparities in levels of compensation awarded to injured research participants across institutions.The defi-
nitions of eligible claimants, compensable injuries, and causation, see infra sectionCreating a Fair and Efficient
No-Fault System for Research—Related Injuries and Claims Evaluation, aim to minimize these discrepancies in
the absence of a federal framework.
67 See infra section Creating a Fair and Efficient No-Fault System for Research—Related Injuries and Claims Eval-
uation.
68 See Pike, supra note 7, at 49.
69 MORAL SCIENCE, supra note 6, at App. IV (listing international and transnational requirements for compen-
sating injured research participants).
70 Data from the European Union’s recent foray into insurance/self-insurance for research-related injuries
suggest that the frequency of research-related injuries is low, the financial cost of providing compensa-
tion for these injuries is low, and the costs of insurance per patient per annum are also quite low. See
EUROPEAN COMOTM’N OF HEALTH & CONSUMERS DIRECTORATE-GENERAL, REVISION OF THE ‘CLINI-
CAL TRIALS DIRECTIVE’ 2001/20/EC: CONCEPT PAPER SUBMITTED FOR PUBLIC CONSULTATION 8 (2011),
http://ec.europa.eu/health/files/clinicaltrials/concept paper 02–2011.pdf (last accessed July 28, 2015).
See also Pike, supra note 7, at 60, 61 (describing the costs of providing compensating for research-related
injuries in the European Union).
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14  Just compensation: a no-fault proposal for research-related injuries
no-fault compensation system—they are costs that are currently absorbed by others
(including injured research participants).71
CREATING A FAIR AND EFFICIENT NO-FAULT SYSTEM
FOR RESEARCH-RELATED INJURIES
The broad no-fault compensation system proposed in this article builds upon the suc-
cess of smaller institution-driven programs that have a history of fairly and efficiently
compensating injured research participants in the United States.72 The recommended
system also shares similarities with international no-fault compensation plans used to
compensate injured research participants around the world,73 and with no-fault com-
pensation plans adopted in the United States in other contexts.74 To successfully im-
plement the proposed system, research institutions and sponsors must undertake four
obligations: first, theymust secure adequate funds—either by self-insuring or acquiring
sufficient insurance—to providemedical care and financial compensation for research-
related injuries; second, they must appoint an administrator to evaluate and manage
claims; third, theymust ensure that sufficient information about the compensation sys-
tem is disclosed in the informed consent process; and fourth, they must maintain ade-
quate records about the compensation system.
At the outset, however, it is essential to establish clear lines of responsibility for es-
tablishing, funding, andmaintaining the compensation system.When research institu-
tions engage in research without sponsors, the institution is responsible for adminis-
tering the claims system and providing medical care and compensation, as described
below. When research institutions conduct research with industry sponsors, the two
parties should negotiate and allocate responsibility for administration of the claims sys-
tem and for the costs of research-related injuries.75 For trials that are industry spon-
sored but not conducted at research institutions (eg conducted by contract research
71 The federal regulations already require certain research protections—most notably IRB approval of research
and informed consent processes—that can be costly to administer. See 45C.F.R. § 46.109, 21C.F.R. § 56.103
(IRB reviewof research); 45C.F.R. §46.116, 21C.F.R. §50.20 et seq. (general requirements of informed con-
sent). Although these costs could otherwise be spent on research, they are nevertheless deemed an essential
part of an ethical research enterprise. Compensation for research-related injuries should be similarly under-
stood as a necessary cost in conducting ethical research.
72 MORAL SCIENCE, supra note 6, at App. III.
73 ASS’N OF THE BRITISH PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, CLINICAL TRIAL COMPENSATION GUIDELINES (2014),
http://www.abpi.org.uk/our-work/library/guidelines/Documents/compensation guidelines 2014.pdf
(last accessed July 27, 2015).
74 See eg, GM IGNITION COMPENSATION CLAIMS RESOLUTION FACILITY, FINAL PROTOCOL FOR
COMPENSATION OF CERTAIN DEATH AND PHYSICAL INJURY CLAIMS PERTAINING TO THE
GM IGNITION SWITCH RECALL, June 30, 2014, http://www.gmignitioncompensation.com/
docs/FINAL%20PROTOCOL%20June%2030%20%202014.pdf [hereinafter GM IGNITION SWITCH,
FINAL PROTOCOL] (last accessed July 27, 2015).
75 Industry sponsors and research institutions typically negotiate costs and responsibilities in their research
contracts. See LEWIN GROUP, supra note 21, at 12. When institutions conduct research with government
sponsors, institutions should propose a mechanism for compensating injured research participants that
complies with the government regulations of the Anti-Deficiency Act and the Adequacy of Appropriations
Act, including incorporating a request for funds into the grant proposal. What Else Should I Know About
Clinical Research?, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CHILD HEALTH AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, Feb. 9, 2011,
https://www.nichd.nih.gov/health/clinicalresearch/clinical-trials/Pages/other-info.aspx (last accessed July
27, 2015) (noting that ‘some clinical research sites carry insurance . . . [which] can be a condition for allowing
a site to participate in a particular federal study’).
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Just compensation: a no-fault proposal for research-related injuries  15
organizations), the industry sponsor bears responsibility for administering the claims
system and providing care and compensation to research participants. Formultisite re-
search, the expectation is that each institution has a system for compensating injured
research participants enrolled in research at their site. Certain aspects of the compen-
sation system could, however, be negotiated and allocated among the various sites.
Institutional and Sponsor Responsibilities
Secure Adequate Funds
Any institution or sponsor conducting human subjects research must secure adequate
funds to cover potential claims.76 Institutions and sponsors can indemnify participants
by either self-insuring—setting aside funds to cover the costs ofmedical care and finan-
cial compensation for research-related injuries—or by purchasing private insurance
that provides the same coverage.Historically, institutions have found itmore cost effec-
tive to self-insure, as the cost of private insurance is often significantly higher than any
injury payouts.77 Institutions and sponsors are expected to set aside funds (or purchase
insurance policies) sufficient to compensate injured participants, taking into account
the number of trials currently being conducted or sponsored, the number of research
participants currently enrolled in trials, and the riskiness of the research protocols.78
Appoint an Administrator
Research institutions and industry sponsors must appoint an administrator to evaluate
andmanage claims. Research institutions and industry sponsors may either appoint an
internal administrator or hire an independent third party to serve as administrator.79
In either case, the administrator must be an individual or group that can receive initial
injury reports, summon the resources and expertise necessary to evaluate the reports
(includingbybringing in specialists tohelp assesswhether an injury is research related),
76 This requirement applies to all institutions conducting human subjects research, including non-profit orga-
nizations, some of which already self-insure or purchase commercial insurance to compensate for research-
related injuries. PHASES Legal Consultation, Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics (Nov. 21, 2014)
(notes on file with Leslie Meltzer Henry).
77 See Moe, supra note 22 (explaining UW’s shift from purchasing private insurance to self-insuring); HEALTH
& CONSUMERS DIRECTORATE-GENERAL, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REVISION OF THE ‘CLINICAL TRIALS
DIRECTIVE’ 2001/20/EC, CONCEPT PAPER SUBMITTED FOR PUBLIC CONSULTATION 23, Feb. 9, 2011,
http://ec.europa.eu/health/files/clinicaltrials/concept paper 02–2011.pdf (last accessed July 27, 2015)
(noting that in an unidentified European Union member state, the total amount of compensation paid out
in fourteen claims over nine years was €43,000, while the cost of the insurance policy was approximately
€235,000).
78 Smaller institutions that are partneringwith larger research centers or receiving grantmoney should take com-
pensation for research-related injuries into account in making those financial arrangements. Ultimately, the
amount that must be set aside is proportionate to the research risks taken on by the institution, and is subject
to negotiation for contributions between the institution and research sponsors.
79 An external administrator that administers a compensation system for a number of institutions offers the ad-
vantage of developing expertise in evaluating research-related injury claims, thereby streamlining the evalua-
tion process and facilitating consistency in compensation across institutions. Choosing an external adminis-
tratormay also eliminate real or perceived conflicts of interest.There are, however, some practical constraints
that may make appointing an external administrator infeasible in this context. For example, if the number
of research-related injuries is as low as some suggest, then the costs of hiring an outside administrator could
significantly outpace compensation payments to injured research participants. Additionally, for many orga-
nizations, appointing an external administrator could cost more than naming an existing, internal employee
to that position.
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16  Just compensation: a no-fault proposal for research-related injuries
and disburse funds consistent with the parameters set forth below. The administrator
should act in accordance with the mission of helping institutions and sponsors fulfill
their ethical obligation to care for and compensate injured research participants.80
Disclose the Availability of Compensation
Information about the compensation system must be adequately disclosed during the
informed consent process. Informed consent documentsmust (1) explain how partici-
pants can report a suspected research-related injury, including the contact information
for the administrator in the event of a suspected research-related injury; (2) describe
the claim evaluation process; and (3) include a statement that medical care and some
types of financial compensation will be made available if a participant’s injury is found
to result from the research, but that punitive damages are not awarded under this com-
pensation system.The informed consent document must also inform participants that
they are expected to report a suspected injury to the administrator as soon as possible,
but in all cases within one year of the incident that gave rise to the injury, and that eval-
uation of claims brought later than one year after the incident will be undertaken at the
discretion of the administrator.81 IRBs play an important role in ensuring that informed
consent documents adequately provide all of this information to research participants.
Maintain Adequate Records
Even in the absence of a full-fledged no-fault compensation program, research institu-
tions and sponsors can and should take immediate steps to maintain records about the
number and types of research injuries reported, how those injuries are addressed, and
the costs of addressing them.Once institutions and sponsors adopt no-fault compensa-
tionplans, theymust also keep adequate records about the claims evaluationprocess for
each claim brought under their program.82 The expectation is that this information will
help promote consistency in outcomes within and across institutions, and will provide
additional data about the rates, types, and costs of research-related injuries.83
80 The administrator is expected to negotiate fairlywith injured research participants.One incentive to negotiate
fairly is that a reasonable offer made by an institution and accepted by an injured research participant means
that the claimwill not subsequently be brought as a tort lawsuit. See infra sectionClaims Evaluation—Waivers
and Appeals. Moreover, it is possible that as time passes, external third party evaluators will emerge in much
the same way as have external IRBs. Institutions could therefore choose to outsource review of injury claims
as a way of heightening assurances of impartiality.
81 Injured research participants who fall outside the no-fault compensation system can still look to the tort sys-
tem, although recovery in tort will remain a challenge for most research participants. See supra section Inad-
equacies of the Status Quo.
82 This records retentionprocess should complywith all relevant state and federal regulations concerningpatient
and research participant privacy.
83 Lackof data is often cited as one reason that a no-fault compensationhas not been implemented. See egEthical
and Policy Issues, supra note 2, at 125 (‘More information is needed about the nature and extent of research-
related injuries and uncompensated research injuries.’); COMPENSATING FOR RESEARCH INJURIES, supra note
14, at 43 (‘To determine the need for, and practical feasibility of, a compensation program, the Commission
recommends that a small experiment be undertaken over a three to five-year period.’).The Presidential Com-
mission for the Study of Bioethical Issues most recently recognized the lack of empirical data on this issue.
See MORAL SCIENCE, supra note 6, at 64 (‘The nature and extent of injury, the type of research in which the
injury is occurring, and the costs of injury to subjects, investigators, and society have not been systematically
studied.’).
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Just compensation: a no-fault proposal for research-related injuries  17
Claims Evaluation
Eligibility
Research participants in both therapeutic and non-therapeutic research are eligible to
apply for no-fault compensation.84 In the event of injury, a research participant or the
participant’s legal representative are theonly eligible claimants.85 In the eventof disabil-
ity or death, however, a participant’s dependentsmay also be entitled to compensation.
In such cases, the compensation system should generally rely on state law to determine
eligible beneficiaries.86 Accordingly, if a decedent has a will, that testamentary docu-
ment determines the eligible claimant(s).87 If the decedent does not have a will, state
laws governing intestacy determine the eligible claimant.
Compensable Injuries
To qualify as compensable,88 an injury must first, be caused by research participation
and, second, be the type of injury for which compensation is justified as an appropriate
remedy.89 As described below, an injury is compensable if themedical or financial harm
was caused by research participation, and acute medical treatment was insufficient to
mitigate the harm suffered.90
Causation
Thequestionofwhich injuries are causedby researchparticipation is complex andhas its
roots in the traditional legal and scientificnotionsof causation.91 Tobe eligible for com-
pensation under the proposed system, a preponderance of the evidence must demon-
strate that research participation was more likely than not a factual, or ‘but for’, cause
of the participant’s injury (ie the injury would not have occurred ‘but for’ the research
participation).92 Research injuries include those resulting from the administration of
84 See infra section Ethical Justifications for Compensation and text surrounding footnotes 44 and 45.
85 This approach has been used in numerous compensation systems and serves to limit the class of potential
claimants to an appropriate and objectively verifiable universe. See eg GM IGNITION SWITCH, FINAL PROTO-
COL, supra note 74. It is also consistent with hospitals’ obligations to identify appropriate surrogate decision
makers for incapacitated patients. See eg OFFICE OF HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH PROTECTIONS, NATIONAL
INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE ON RESEARCH INVOLVING ADULTS WHO ARE OR
MAYBEUNABLE TOCONSENT, June 26, 2013, http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/ohsr/public/SOP 14E v1 6-26-13.pdf
(last accessed July 28, 2015). See also 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(g) (2013) (allowing a patient’s legally authorized
representative to access patient files).
86 See eg GM IGNITION SWITCH, FINAL PROTOCOL, supra note 74.
87 See eg KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHO GETS WHAT: FAIR COMPENSATION AFTER TRAGEDY AND FINANCIAL
UPHEAVAL 72 (2012) (describing the approach taken in the 9/11 victims’ compensation fund).This approach
has the benefit of allowing hospital procedures to fit neatly into the legal systems of the states in which they
are governed.
88 A compensable injury is one for which financial compensation is owed.
89 Pike, supra note 7, at 56.
90 Acute medical care should be provided free of charge under the proposed no-fault system. If the research site
does not have the capacity to provide acute care for injuries (eg a contract research organization facility),
then any costs for acute care provided elsewhere are subject to reimbursement and should be considered a
compensable injury.
91 See Megan E. Larkin, Defining Compensable Injury in Biomedical Research, 25 HEALTH MATRIX 309, 354–55
(Spring 2015).
92 The Restatement Third of Torts refers to this form of causation as ‘factual causation’, as well as by the more
familiar ‘but for test’. RESTATEMENTTHIRDOFTORTS § 26 cmt. b (2010) (‘A factual cause can also be described
as a necessary condition for the outcome.’). See also David. W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in
Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1765, 1768 (1997) (noting that the ‘but-for test’ is the most widely used test for factual
causation); Larkin, supra note 91, at 363.
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18  Just compensation: a no-fault proposal for research-related injuries
research interventions and those that arise from the performance of related medical
procedures that would not be performed in the ordinary course of clinical care.93 In
these cases, it can be fairly said that researchparticipation leads to a set of circumstances
that differsmaterially fromwhatwould otherwise have occurred, and that set of circum-
stances leads to the injury.94
Questions of causation are more difficult to parse in cases where individuals are
involved in so-called therapeutic research.95 When determining whether a research-
related injury has occurred in trials involving patient participants, one factor to con-
sider is whether research participants were deprived of the standard of care treatment
for their medical condition.96 To determine whether a research-related injury has oc-
curred, the decisionmaker should weigh the difference between what would have hap-
pened had the standard of care been administered and what actually happened as a re-
sult of the research procedures.97
Injuries that occur during research, but that are not attributable to the research it-
self (for example, a car accident that occurs en route to the research site) should not be
eligible for compensation.98 This limitation is both a matter of policy—limiting cover-
age to injuries that are within the scope of risk that the compensation plan is designed
to address—and amatter of compensatory justice—ensuring coverage for injuries suf-
fered in the course of undertaking risks for the benefit of others.99 In cases where there
is culpable or tortious conduct on the part of a third party, the tort system—rather
than a no-fault compensation system—is better equipped to make an injured research
participant whole.
93 See Larkin, supra note 91, at 364, 368 (discussing the relationship between causation by omission and the
standard of care). Determinations and attributions of causation are routinely made in the adverse-event re-
porting and medical malpractice contexts, and similar forces are at work here.
94 Id. at 363.
95 Compensatory justice nevertheless acknowledges that the decision to participate in research, which involves
assuming additional research risks to produce societal benefit, warrants compensation when injuries result
from research-related interventions. See Id. at 353; see also supra sectionEthical Justifications forCompensation
(providing an ethical justification for including patient participants, who are enrolled in so-called therapeutic
research, in the class of potential claimants).
96 Larkin, supra note 91, at 366, 367.
97 See Id.
98 To give another example, if an individual participates in research for a novel therapy intended to treat the par-
ticipant’s underlying condition, any injury incurred that is over and above what the participant would have
suffered as a result of the natural progression of the underlying condition, would be entitled to compensation
because participation in research, rather than the underlying disease, caused the participant’s injury. How-
ever, when a patient participant’s injury is caused or worsened by the patient’s own failure to follow the trial
protocol, attribution of cause to clinical trial participation may not be warranted. See Id. at 363, 364.
99 See supra section Ethical Justifications for Compensation (discussing compensatory justice). Compensation is
intended to redress injuries suffered by individuals who undertake risks in an activity that is for the benefit
of others.This limitation on the compensation system is consistent with the approach taken in RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)OFTORTS:PHYSICAL&EMOTIONALHARMch. 6SpecialNote (2010) (eliminating the term ‘proximate
cause’ in favor of the more precise term ‘scope of liability’). Because there is no tortious conduct to define
the scope of liability in a no-fault compensation plan, it is more appropriate to define the scope of liability by
examining the types of risks that the compensation planwas put in place to guard against. See Id.; Larkin, supra
note 91, at 361, 362. Some have claimed that only foreseeable risks should be compensable, but this position
is untenable because research inherently involves risks that are unknown and unknowable, particularly for the
research subject, who is in a position of information asymmetry. Limitations should therefore not be placed
on the range of compensable injuries based on the foreseeability of the biomedical research risk. See Id. at 338
(citingMORAL SCIENCE, supra note 6, at 70).
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Just compensation: a no-fault proposal for research-related injuries  19
Degree and Type of Injury
In the absence of fault, compensation should be provided only in cases of demonstra-
ble medical and financial injury.100 Many research-related injuries may be small or in-
significant in nature, requiring little or no further medical care and resulting in no fi-
nancial harm.101 For these injuries, compensation is unnecessary to redress the harm
caused. For more serious injuries, however, compensation is required. All injuries re-
quiring medical care beyond acute care warrant compensation.102 Financial injuries,
such as lost wages and disability, that stem from medical injuries should also receive
compensation.
Evaluation Process
Claims for compensation must be addressed fairly and efficiently by a system that is
transparent and accessible to research participants. The compensation system is trig-
gered when the system administrator is contacted by either a participant, who suspects
he or she has suffered a research-related injury, or a principal investigator (PI), who
reports a research-related adverse event. Regardless of how the claim arises, the ad-
ministrator must open a case file and request a preliminary determination from the PI
about the likelihood that the participant’s injury was caused by research participation.
Because the PI often has themost detailed knowledge of the research protocol and any
underlying medical conditions being studied, he or she is generally best qualified to
determine whether a participant’s symptoms reflect a possible adverse reaction to the
study intervention or procedures, or are instead unrelated to the study or related to the
natural progression of the participant’s underlying illness.103 PIs are expected to make
fair and timely preliminary determinations (ie, within 7 days of the initial report, or
sooner if circumstances demand).
After the administrator receives the PI’s preliminary determination, the administra-
tor must notify the participant of that determination and grant the participant notice
of a right to be heard during the claims evaluation process. This includes the right to
present documentary evidence of the nature and extent of any injury—both physical
and financial—and the relatedness of the injury to research.104 Once in possession of
all relevant evidence, the administrator must evaluate the information andmake a final
determination about whether the participant’s injury is compensable. If after reviewing
100 See Larkin, supra note 91, at 370, 371 (arguing that no-fault compensation is only required in cases ofmedical
andfinancial injury, and that intangible harms, such as dignitary or spiritual injuriesmaybe addressedbyother
mechanisms).
101 See Pike, supra note 7, at 57 (‘Minor injuries, such as bleeding or bruising, should be dealt with on-site and
on-the-spot.’).
102 For these purposes, health care includes medical care, mental health care, dental care, and physical therapy.
103 PIsmay not be entirely free from conflicts of interest. On the one hand, theymay have an interest inmaintain-
ing an unblemished safety record, which could influence them to make a decision that injuries are unrelated
to the research. Alternatively, PIs may be interested in protecting their research participants, which could
lead them to favor compensation, regardless of whether the injury is actually research related. The review
and appeals process are intended to safeguard the participants and institution/sponsor from these potential
conflicts.
104 GM IGNITION SWITCH, FINAL PROTOCOL, supra note 74, at 11 (‘Both the individual claimant and GM reserve
the right to submit to the Facility any information deemed relevant to the Administrator’s evaluation and
determination of any such Individual Death Claim or Category One Physical Injury Claim before the final
processing and determination of the claim.’).
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20  Just compensation: a no-fault proposal for research-related injuries
all evidence, the administrator determines that it is more likely than not that the partic-
ipant’s injury was caused by the research, compensation should be offered commensu-
rate with the injury suffered.105 If, taking into account all evidence presented as viewed
in the light most favorable to the research participant, the administrator determines
that the injury is not research related, no compensation will be offered.106 Administra-
tors are expected tomake determinations in a fair and timelymanner (iewithin 60 days,
or faster if circumstances demand).
Remedies
Separate and apart from compensation, medical care must be made available in pro-
portion to the seriousness of the underlying research-related injury. Acutemedical care
for research-related injuries must be provided and should, when possible, be provided
free of charge. If the participant is billed for the cost of acute care necessary to mitigate
the harm from a research-related injury, he or she should be reimbursed through the
no-fault compensation system.107 With respect to long-term medical care, the com-
pensation plan should offer injured research participants a choice of receiving either
long-term medical care at the institution where they suffered the injury, or a lump
sum payment designed to compensate for the cost of future medical needs. In addi-
tion to compensation formedical care, financial remedies available should include pay-
ment for disability (either short or long term) and a death benefit available to the next
of kin.
Disability payments for both long-term and short-term disabilities should be tied
to a recognized national standard.108 Short-term disability payments are warranted
only if the financial burden frommissed work and attendant costs is greater than what
would ordinarily be required of trial participants.109 Long-term disability, by contrast,
is compensable whenever the participant is likely to suffer lasting health effects of the
105 See supra sectionCausation. To award compensation, the administratormust determine that ‘it is more likely
than not that . . . the [claimant’s] harm would not have occurred’ if the claimant had not participated in the
research trial. RESTATEMENT THIRD OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM, § 26, cmt. l.
106 Administrators are encouraged to evaluate claims favorably on behalf of injured research participants because
injured research participants are at an informational disadvantage in trying to prove that their injury was
research related.
107 It should be recognized that this provision may raise questions related to coordination of benefits when the
participant has private or government-provided insurance. See infra notes at 115–121 and surrounding text.
108 See eg Federal Employees Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8105–8106 (2012), setting disability bene-
fits at 66 2/3 per cent of an employee’s monthly pay or ‘66 2/3 percent of the difference between his
monthly pay and his monthly wage-earning capacity after the beginning of the partial disability’. This is
also the approach suggested by the U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SECRETARY’S TASK
FORCE ON THE COMPENSATION OF INJURED RESEARCH SUBJECTS: REPORT II-2 (1977). But see Division
of Coal Mine Worker’s Compensation, Black Lung Monthly Benefit Rates for 2015, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/owcp/dcmwc/regs/compliance/blbene.htm (last accessed Feb. 5, 2015). (which sets
the benefit for all coal miners based on the equivalent disability payment for an employee at GS-2, Step 1).
109 For example, if a participant is participating in a clinical trial wherein participants are expected to be hospital-
ized for 10 days and suffers a complication during the trial, which would ordinarily have required hospitaliza-
tion if it had occurred out of the trial setting, but did not require any actual lengthening of the participant’s
hospital stay or time away from work, no compensation beyond the cost of treatment would be owed.
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Just compensation: a no-fault proposal for research-related injuries  21
research-related injury, and those effects either prevent or limit the participant’s ability
to work.110
Both death and disability benefits should be paid in an amount that does not vary
based on an individual participant’s income, and that keeps pace with inflation.111
A standard amount avoids exacerbating existing income inequalities,112 prevents the
creation of incentives for institutions to select research participants solely from low-
income populations, promotes expedient distribution of funds, and leads to consistent
protection for injured research participants across institutions.113 Institutions may go
beyond the standard required payment if so desired.114
Institutions that implement no-fault compensation should work with the relevant
stakeholders (including private insurers, Medicare, and Medicaid) to coordinate ben-
efits (eg payments for medical care, disability, and death);115 to ensure that claims are
paid correctly; and to avoid duplicate payments.116 Billing departments at larger insti-
tutions already negotiate the coordination of benefits for clinical care. Coordinating
benefits in the research context would therefore be only a minor expansion of existing
negotiations. Smaller institutions may, however, find the process of coordinating ben-
efits more challenging.
Institutional compensation policies must also be mindful of Medicare Secondary
Payer provisions. Under these provisions, Medicare does not pay certain expenses or
110 See eg 5 U.S.C. §§ 8105–8107 (2012). Whether or not research participants should also be compensated for
their time spent as research participants is beyond the scope of this article, but subject to robust debate within
the bioethics literature. See egHolly F. Lynch,Human Research Subjects as Human ResearchWorkers, 14 YALE
J. HEALTH POL’Y LAW ETHICS (2014); Christine Grady, Payment of Clinical Research Subjects, 115 J. CLIN.
INVEST. 1681, 1687 (2005).
111 Benefits could be tied, for example, to a grade of the FederalGeneral Schedule (GS) salary.TheGS is adjusted
to rise with inflation, and, if cost of living adjustments were omitted, would be uniform across the country.
Such an approach has already been taken by at least one federal compensation program. See eg Division of
Coal Mine Worker’s Compensation, supra note 108 (which sets the benefit for all coal miners disabled by
black lung disease at a percentage of the base salary of a Federal employee at level GS-2, Step 1). See also 30
U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (2012); 20 C.F.R. § 726.203(c)(4) (2014).
112 See FEINBERG, supra note 87, at 68 (explaining that compensation systems that are deliberately de-coupled
from the tort system, in favor of equality of payment, are a way of promoting healing).
113 Genevieve M. Grant et al., Relationship Between Stressfulness of Claiming for Injury Compensation and Long-
Term Recovery: A Prospective Cohort Study, 71 JAMA 446 (2014). The amounts paid out by institutions do
not need to be ‘joined at the hip’ to tort damages in order to deter potential litigants. See FEINBERG, supra
note 87, at 100,102.
114 This article does not set forth a precise amount that shouldbepaid. Such adetermination, ifmadeon anational
scale, ismore appropriatelymade using notice and comment rulemaking under theAdministrative Procedure
Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 553. Use of the administrative rulemaking process would give interested parties with the
relevant expertise a full and fair opportunity to have input into the determination of the appropriate national
compensation rate. This article also does not propose a mandatory limitation on liability: Developing a for-
mula for determining the amount of compensation, combined with accurately assessing the riskiness of an
institution’s research portfolio, provides an adequate basis for predicting future claims. Institutions may wish
to set their own caps on liability for other practical or actuarial reasons, but there is no compelling ethical basis
for doing so.
115 It should be noted that coordination of benefits does not necessarily mean that private insurance pays before
the no-fault compensation program; it simplymeans that the relevant payers allocate payment responsibility.
The apportionment of cost sharing among the parties is subject to relevant contracts, statutes, and regulations
in addition to the particular facts of each case.
116 See eg Coordination of Benefits, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, http://www.cms.gov/
Medicare/Coordination-of-Benefits-and-Recovery/Coordination-of-Benefits-and-Recovery-Overview/
Coordination-of-Benefits/Coordination-of-Benefits.html (last accessed July 28, 2015).
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22  Just compensation: a no-fault proposal for research-related injuries
claims if another entity is responsible for paying.117 Per these provisions, no-fault com-
pensation systems are considered primary payers, and Medicare generally will not pay
for an injury or illness covered by no-fault compensation.118 Similar requirements ap-
ply under Medicaid Third Party Liability provisions, which require states to seek pay-
ment for medical expenses from liable third parties before paying a claim from Med-
icaid funds.119 Accordingly, institutions and sponsors should be aware that offers to
provide no-fault compensationmay affect payment otherwise due toMedicare orMed-
icaid recipients.120 This administrative barrier could be overcome if the Medicare Sec-
ondary Payer provisions and analogous Medicaid Third Party Liability requirements
were modified so that payments made under a no-fault compensation system were ex-
empted from consideration in the application of those provisions, or, alternatively, if
the Centers for Medicare andMedicaid Services provided guidance on when and how
the secondary payer and third party liability provisions should be applied to injured
research participants who are also Medicare or Medicaid beneficiaries.121
Waivers and Appeals
A research participant’s acceptance of an offer of financial compensation made under
this system extinguishes future legal claims against the institution or sponsor arising
from the injury, and a statement to that effect should be signed by all parties.122 In-
jured participants who reject the administrator’s decision can either request alternative
dispute resolution with amutually acceptable, independent expert paid for by the insti-
tution or sponsor, or they may bring suit.123
117 Medicare Secondary Payer, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, http://www.cms.gov/
Medicare/Coordination-of-Benefits-and-Recovery/Coordination-of-Benefits-and-Recovery-Overview/
Medicare-Secondary-Payer/Medicare-Secondary-Payer.html (last accessed July 28, 2015).
118 Id.
119 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a, § 1902 (2012). See also CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEFICIT
REDUCTION ACT IMPORTANT FACTS FOR STATE LAWMAKERS (Dec. 11, 2007), http://www.cms.gov/
Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/DeficitReductionAct/downloads/tpl.pdf (last accessed July 27,
2015). Compare withMedicare Secondary Payer, supra note 117. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b) (2012) [sec-
tion 1862(b) of the Social Security Act]; 42 C.F.R. Part 411 (2013).
120 In the event of uncertain no-fault payments, Medicare may make a conditional payment so that a beneficiary
will not have to go out of pocket to pay medical bills.The payment must be repaid once a settlement or other
payment is made.Medicare Secondary Payer, supra note 117.
121 While most payers are considered to be primary payers toMedicare, Id., orMedicaid (underMedicaid provi-
sions this is referred to as ‘thirdparty liability’), there are someexisting exemptions including services provided
through RyanWhite programs. See 42 U.S.C. § 300ff–25(b)(2) (2012).
122 This requirement does not violate the federal prohibitions on exculpatory language, see 45 C.F.R. § 46.116
(2013) and21C.F.R.§50.20 (2014), because thewaiver is not givenduring the informedconsentprocess, but
instead only upon receipt of compensation for a research-related injury. See alsoGMIGNITIONSWITCH,FINAL
PROTOCOL, supra note 86, at 10 (‘In order for the claim to be eligible for payment, all claimants must consent
to participate in the Facility and agree to be bound by its terms, but shall not release any legal rights until
an award is determined, the claimant is notified, and the claimant accepts the award and executes a binding
release.’); ASS’N OF THE BRITISH PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, supra note 73, § 5 (‘[P]atients will normally be
asked to accept that any payment made under the Guidelines will be in full settlement of their claims.’).
123 ASS’N OF THE BRITISH PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, supra note 73, § 4.3 [‘In any case where the company
concedes that a payment shouldbemade to apatient but there exists a differenceof opinionbetween company
and patient as to the appropriate level of compensation, it is recommended that the company agrees to seek at
its own cost (andmake available to the patient) the opinion of amutually acceptable independent expert, and
that his opinion should be given substantial weight by the company in reaching its decision on the appropriate
payment to be made.’].
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Just compensation: a no-fault proposal for research-related injuries  23
MODIFYING THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Incorporating the proposed system into the existing legal framework requires modi-
fication of the two primary regulations that currently govern much of the biomedical
research conducted in theUnited States:TheCommonRule, which applies to research
at institutions receiving federal funding, and theFood andDrugAdministration (FDA)
regulations, which applies (among other activities) to research that supports applica-
tions for drug and device approval.124 These regulations currently require that partic-
ipants be told whether compensation for research-related injuries will be made avail-
able, but do not require institutions or sponsors to provide such compensation.125 An
amendment requiring, instead, that research institutions and sponsors ensure appro-
priate care and compensation for research-related injuries would effectively covermost
human subjects research conducted in the United States.126 In the absence of regula-
tory action, research institutions and sponsors should begin implementing the no-fault
compensation systemproposed above, and funders—like theNIHandothers—should
make compensation a condition of receiving funds.127 Doing so is an important step to-
ward harmonizing institutional policies both nationally and internationally, and toward
fulfilling an important ethical obligation.
CONCLUSION
Biomedical research plays an undeniably important role in developing life-sustaining
and life-enhancing medical advances, but this progress comes at a cost. Research, no
matter how well designed and ethically conducted, carries uncertainties and exposes
participants to risk of injury.When injury occurs, compensatory justice—coupledwith
the well-accepted ethical principles of professional beneficence and nonmaleficence—
requires that research participants not be left worse off as a result of their participation.
124 The FDA regulations apply to ‘all clinical investigations regulated by the Food and Drug Administration un-
der sections 505(i) and 520(g) of the Federal Food, Drug, andCosmetic Act, as well as clinical investigations
that support applications for research ormarketing permits for products regulated by the Food andDrug Ad-
ministration, including foods, including dietary supplements, that bear a nutrient content claim or a health
claim, infant formulas, food and color additives, drugs for human use, medical devices for human use, biolog-
ical products for human use, and electronic products.’ 21 C.F.R. § 50.1 (2014).
125 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(6) (2013); 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(6) (2014).
126 The Common Rule currently applies, with some exceptions, to ‘all research involving human subjects con-
ducted, supported or otherwise subject to regulation by any federal department or agency which takes appro-
priate administrative action to make the policy applicable to such research’. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2013).
127 In addition, the NIH can provide extramural funds for compensation, consistent with its grant-making
authority. See eg NIH Grants Policy Statement, NIH OFFICE OF EXTRAMURAL RESEARCH (Oct. 2013),
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/nihgps 2013/nihgps ch7.htm#direct indirect costs (last accessed July
28, 2015); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13ffi760, BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH: NIH SHOULD
ASSESS THE IMPACT OF GROWTH IN INDIRECT COSTS ON ITS MISSION (September 2013),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/658087.pdf (last accessed July 28, 2015). This mechanism, by which the
NIH allocates funds to grant recipients for no-fault compensation, complies with the Adequacy of Appropri-
ations and Anti-Deficiency Acts. 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(A); 41 U.S.C. § 11(a). These acts, which generally
limit the government’s ability to incur future financial obligations that have not yet been appropriated, would
not preclude the NIH from appropriating extramural grant funds for compensation, so long as the compen-
sation was limited to the amount allocated in the grant. See COMPENSATION OF INJURED RESEARCH SUBJECTS,
supranote 14, atV-4 (‘[I]f institutions chose to fund such a systemwith insurance, the premiums ascribable to
the insurance could be paid from grant or contract funds under current department policies.’). Implementing
a no-fault insurance/self-insurance program for federal agencies presents additional, but not insurmountable
challenges.
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24  Just compensation: a no-fault proposal for research-related injuries
This ethical analysis is not novel. For more than four decades, national advisory
bodies have considered research-related injuries and have repeatedly concluded that
participants are entitled to receive medical care and financial compensation for
research-related injuries. Despite consensus on this point, no steps have been taken to
implement systematic no-fault compensation for research-related injuries in theUnited
States. Rather, injured research participants are left to the vagaries of the tort law sys-
tem, an approach that leaves participants to either shoulder the physical and financial
burdens of their research-related injuries alone or play the ‘litigation lottery’, with its
daunting odds.
Certain institutions have taken steps to provide no-fault compensation to injured
research participants, but these institutions remain the exceptions to the rule. With-
out uniform and systematic no-fault compensation, the inconsistent policies of institu-
tions and sponsors leave many research participants unprotected and provide uneven
redress for others. This inconsistency, which is intensified by the growth of multisite
research and themove to single-IRB review, is ethically unjustifiable and pragmatically
untenable.
This article therefore proposes a no-fault compensation system that aims to treat
like cases alike, offer just compensation for the harm sought to be remedied, and dis-
burse compensation with maximum efficiency and minimum administrative cost. This
approach should be mandated by modification of the regulations governing research,
and in the meantime, voluntarily adopted by research institutions and industry spon-
sors. By describing the eligible claimants, defining compensable injuries, establishing
the remedies to be provided, and setting forth a standardized process for evaluating
claims, the system proposed in this article seeks to rectify an ethical infirmity that has
endured for far too long.
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